The process here is always the same. The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain.
Somebody contradicts them; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions.
He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to change first this opinion, and then that for they resist change very variously , until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and the new experience and runs them into one another most felicitously and expediently.
This new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves the older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible.
An outree explanation, violating all our preconceptions, would never pass for a true account of a novelty. We should scratch round industriously till we found something less excentric.
The most violent revolutions in an individual's beliefs leave most of his old order standing. Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one's own biography remain untouched. New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions.
It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. We hold a theory true just in proportion to its success in solving this 'problem of maxima and minima.
We say this theory solves it on the whole more satisfactorily than that theory; but that means more satisfactorily to ourselves, and individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently.
To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic. The point I now urge you to observe particularly is the part played by the older truths. Failure to take account of it is the source of much of the unjust criticism leveled against pragmatism.
Their influence is absolutely controlling. Loyalty to them is the first principle—in most cases it is the only principle; for by far the most usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would make for a serious rearrangement of our preconceptions is to ignore them altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness for them.
You doubtless wish examples of this process of truth's growth, and the only trouble is their superabundance. The simplest case of new truth is of course the mere numerical addition of new kinds of facts, or of new single facts of old kinds, to our experience—an addition that involves no alteration in the old beliefs.
Day follows day, and its contents are simply added. Truth is what we say about them, and when we say that they have come, truth is satisfied by the plain additive formula. But often the day's contents oblige a rearrangement. If I should now utter piercing shrieks and act like a maniac on this platform, it would make many of you revise your ideas as to the probable worth of my philosophy.
The mere sight of radium paying heat away indefinitely out of its own pocket seemed to violate that conservation. What to think? If the radiations from it were nothing but an escape of unsuspected 'potential' energy, pre-existent inside of the atoms, the principle of conservation would be saved.
The discovery of 'helium' as the radiation's outcome, opened a way to this belief. So Ramsay's view is generally held to be true, because, altho it extends our old ideas of energy, it causes a minimum of alteration in their nature.
I need not multiply instances. A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock.
It must both lean on old truth and grasp new fact; and its success as I said a moment ago in doing this, is a matter for the individual's appreciation. When old truth grows, then, by new truth's addition, it is for subjective reasons. We are in the process and obey the reasons. That new idea is truest which performs most felicitously its function of satisfying our double urgency. It makes itself true, gets itself classed as true, by the way it works; grafting itself then upon the ancient body of truth, which thus grows much as a tree grows by the activity of a new layer of cambium.
Now Dewey and Schiller proceed to generalize this observation and to apply it to the most ancient parts of truth. They also once were plastic. They also were called true for human reasons. They also mediated between still earlier truths and what in those days were novel observations. Purely objective truth, truth in whose establishment the function of giving human satisfaction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts played no role whatever, is nowhere to be found.
The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything. Truth independent; truth that we FIND merely; truth no longer malleable to human need; truth incorrigible, in a word; such truth exists indeed superabundantly—or is supposed to exist by rationalistically minded thinkers; but then it means only the dead heart of the living tree, and its being there means only that truth also has its paleontology and its 'prescription,' and may grow stiff with years of veteran service and petrified in men's regard by sheer antiquity.
But how plastic even the oldest truths nevertheless really are has been vividly shown in our day by the transformation of logical and mathematical ideas, a transformation which seems even to be invading physics.
The ancient formulas are reinterpreted as special expressions of much wider principles, principles that our ancestors never got a glimpse of in their present shape and formulation. Schiller still gives to all this view of truth the name of 'Humanism,' but, for this doctrine too, the name of pragmatism seems fairly to be in the ascendant, so I will treat it under the name of pragmatism in these lectures. Such then would be the scope of pragmatism—first, a method; and second, a genetic theory of what is meant by truth.
And these two things must be our future topics. What I have said of the theory of truth will, I am sure, have appeared obscure and unsatisfactory to most of you by reason of us brevity. I shall make amends for that hereafter.
In a lecture on 'common sense' I shall try to show what I mean by truths grown petrified by antiquity. In another lecture I shall expatiate on the idea that our thoughts become true in proportion as they successfully exert their go-between function. In a third I shall show how hard it is to discriminate subjective from objective factors in Truth's development.
You may not follow me wholly in these lectures; and if you do, you may not wholly agree with me. But you will, I know, regard me at least as serious, and treat my effort with respectful consideration. You will probably be surprised to learn, then, that Messrs. Schiller's and Dewey's theories have suffered a hailstorm of contempt and ridicule. All rationalism has risen against them. In influential quarters Mr.
Schiller, in particular, has been treated like an impudent schoolboy who deserves a spanking. I should not mention this, but for the fact that it throws so much sidelight upon that rationalistic temper to which I have opposed the temper of pragmatism. Pragmatism is uncomfortable away from facts. Rationalism is comfortable only in the presence of abstractions.
This pragmatist talk about truths in the plural, about their utility and satisfactoriness, about the success with which they 'work,' etc. Such truths are not real truth.
Such tests are merely subjective. As against this, objective truth must be something non-utilitarian, haughty, refined, remote, august, exalted. It must be an absolute correspondence of our thoughts with an equally absolute reality. The conditioned ways in which we DO think are so much irrelevance and matter for psychology. Down with psychology, up with logic, in all this question! See the exquisite contrast of the types of mind! The pragmatist clings to facts and concreteness, observes truth at its work in particular cases, and generalizes.
Truth, for him, becomes a class-name for all sorts of definite working-values in experience. For the rationalist it remains a pure abstraction, to the bare name of which we must defer. When the pragmatist undertakes to show in detail just WHY we must defer, the rationalist is unable to recognize the concretes from which his own abstraction is taken.
Your typical ultra-abstractionist fairly shudders at concreteness: other things equal, he positively prefers the pale and spectral. If the two universes were offered, he would always choose the skinny outline rather than the rich thicket of reality. It is so much purer, clearer, nobler. I hope that as these lectures go on, the concreteness and closeness to facts of the pragmatism which they advocate may be what approves itself to you as its most satisfactory peculiarity.
It only follows here the example of the sister-sciences, interpreting the unobserved by the observed. It brings old and new harmoniously together. It converts the absolutely empty notion of a static relation of 'correspondence' what that may mean we must ask later between our minds and reality, into that of a rich and active commerce that anyone may follow in detail and understand between particular thoughts of ours, and the great universe of other experiences in which they play their parts and have their uses.
But enough of this at present? The justification of what I say must be postponed. I wish now to add a word in further explanation of the claim I made at our last meeting, that pragmatism may be a happy harmonizer of empiricist ways of thinking, with the more religious demands of human beings.
Men who are strongly of the fact-loving temperament, you may remember me to have said, are liable to be kept at a distance by the small sympathy with facts which that philosophy from the present-day fashion of idealism offers them. It is far too intellectualistic. Old fashioned theism was bad enough, with its notion of God as an exalted monarch, made up of a lot of unintelligible or preposterous 'attributes'; but, so long as it held strongly by the argument from design, it kept some touch with concrete realities.
Since, however, darwinism has once for all displaced design from the minds of the 'scientific,' theism has lost that foothold; and some kind of an immanent or pantheistic deity working IN things rather than above them is, if any, the kind recommended to our contemporary imagination. Aspirants to a philosophic religion turn, as a rule, more hopefully nowadays towards idealistic pantheism than towards the older dualistic theism, in spite of the fact that the latter still counts able defenders.
But, as I said in my first lecture, the brand of pantheism offered is hard for them to assimilate if they are lovers of facts, or empirically minded. It is the absolutistic brand, spurning the dust and reared upon pure logic. It keeps no connexion whatever with concreteness. Affirming the Absolute Mind, which is its substitute for God, to be the rational presupposition of all particulars of fact, whatever they may be, it remains supremely indifferent to what the particular facts in our world actually are.
Be they what they may, the Absolute will father them. Like the sick lion in Esop's fable, all footprints lead into his den, but nulla vestigia retrorsum. You cannot redescend into the world of particulars by the Absolute's aid, or deduce any necessary consequences of detail important for your life from your idea of his nature. He gives you indeed the assurance that all is well with Him, and for his eternal way of thinking; but thereupon he leaves you to be finitely saved by your own temporal devices.
Far be it from me to deny the majesty of this conception, or its capacity to yield religious comfort to a most respectable class of minds. But from the human point of view, no one can pretend that it doesn't suffer from the faults of remoteness and abstractness. It is eminently a product of what I have ventured to call the rationalistic temper.
It disdains empiricism's needs. It substitutes a pallid outline for the real world's richness. It is dapper; it is noble in the bad sense, in the sense in which to be noble is to be inapt for humble service. In this real world of sweat and dirt, it seems to me that when a view of things is 'noble,' that ought to count as a presumption against its truth, and as a philosophic disqualification. The prince of darkness may be a gentleman, as we are told he is, but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, he can surely be no gentleman.
His menial services are needed in the dust of our human trials, even more than his dignity is needed in the empyrean. Now pragmatism, devoted tho she be to facts, has no such materialistic bias as ordinary empiricism labors under. Moreover, she has no objection whatever to the realizing of abstractions, so long as you get about among particulars with their aid and they actually carry you somewhere.
Interested in no conclusions but those which our minds and our experiences work out together, she has no a priori prejudices against theology. What I said just now about the Absolute of transcendental idealism is a case in point. First, I called it majestic and said it yielded religious comfort to a class of minds, and then I accused it of remoteness and sterility. But so far as it affords such comfort, it surely is not sterile; it has that amount of value; it performs a concrete function.
As a good pragmatist, I myself ought to call the Absolute true 'in so far forth,' then; and I unhesitatingly now do so. To answer, we need only apply the pragmatic method. What do believers in the Absolute mean by saying that their belief affords them comfort? They mean that since in the Absolute finite evil is 'overruled' already, we may, therefore, whenever we wish, treat the temporal as if it were potentially the eternal, be sure that we can trust its outcome, and, without sin, dismiss our fear and drop the worry of our finite responsibility.
In short, they mean that we have a right ever and anon to take a moral holiday, to let the world wag in its own way, feeling that its issues are in better hands than ours and are none of our business. The universe is a system of which the individual members may relax their anxieties occasionally, in which the don't-care mood is also right for men, and moral holidays in order—that, if I mistake not, is part, at least, of what the Absolute is 'known-as,' that is the great difference in our particular experiences which his being true makes for us, that is part of his cash-value when he is pragmatically interpreted.
Farther than that the ordinary lay-reader in philosophy who thinks favorably of absolute idealism does not venture to sharpen his conceptions. He can use the Absolute for so much, and so much is very precious. He is pained at hearing you speak incredulously of the Absolute, therefore, and disregards your criticisms because they deal with aspects of the conception that he fails to follow.
If the Absolute means this, and means no more than this, who can possibly deny the truth of it? To deny it would be to insist that men should never relax, and that holidays are never in order.
I am well aware how odd it must seem to some of you to hear me say that an idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives.
That it is GOOD, for as much as it profits, you will gladly admit. If what we do by its aid is good, you will allow the idea itself to be good in so far forth, for we are the better for possessing it.
But is it not a strange misuse of the word 'truth,' you will say, to call ideas also 'true' for this reason? To answer this difficulty fully is impossible at this stage of my account. You touch here upon the very central point of Messrs. Schiller's, Dewey's and my own doctrine of truth, which I cannot discuss with detail until my sixth lecture.
Surely you must admit this, that if there were NO good for life in true ideas, or if the knowledge of them were positively disadvantageous and false ideas the only useful ones, then the current notion that truth is divine and precious, and its pursuit a duty, could never have grown up or become a dogma.
In a world like that, our duty would be to SHUN truth, rather. But in this world, just as certain foods are not only agreeable to our taste, but good for our teeth, our stomach and our tissues; so certain ideas are not only agreeable to think about, or agreeable as supporting other ideas that we are fond of, but they are also helpful in life's practical struggles. This sounds very like a definition of truth. And can we then keep the notion of what is better for us, and what is true for us, permanently apart?
Pragmatism says no, and I fully agree with her. Probably you also agree, so far as the abstract statement goes, but with a suspicion that if we practically did believe everything that made for good in our own personal lives, we should be found indulging all kinds of fancies about this world's affairs, and all kinds of sentimental superstitions about a world hereafter.
Your suspicion here is undoubtedly well founded, and it is evident that something happens when you pass from the abstract to the concrete, that complicates the situation. Now in real life what vital benefits is any particular belief of ours most liable to clash with? In other words, the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths. Truths have once for all this desperate instinct of self-preservation and of desire to extinguish whatever contradicts them.
My belief in the Absolute, based on the good it does me, must run the gauntlet of all my other beliefs. Grant that it may be true in giving me a moral holiday. Nevertheless, as I conceive it,—and let me speak now confidentially, as it were, and merely in my own private person,—it clashes with other truths of mine whose benefits I hate to give up on its account. It happens to be associated with a kind of logic of which I am the enemy, I find that it entangles me in metaphysical paradoxes that are inacceptable, etc.
But as I have enough trouble in life already without adding the trouble of carrying these intellectual inconsistencies, I personally just give up the Absolute. I just TAKE my moral holidays; or else as a professional philosopher, I try to justify them by some other principle. If I could restrict my notion of the Absolute to its bare holiday-giving value, it wouldn't clash with my other truths. But we cannot easily thus restrict our hypotheses. They carry supernumerary features, and these it is that clash so.
My disbelief in the Absolute means then disbelief in those other supernumerary features, for I fully believe in the legitimacy of taking moral holidays. You see by this what I meant when I called pragmatism a mediator and reconciler and said, borrowing the word from Papini, that he unstiffens our theories. She has in fact no prejudices whatever, no obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. She is completely genial.
She will entertain any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence. It follows that in the religious field she is at a great advantage both over positivistic empiricism, with its anti-theological bias, and over religious rationalism, with its exclusive interest in the remote, the noble, the simple, and the abstract in the way of conception. In short, she widens the field of search for God. Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external senses.
Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses, and to count the humblest and most personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical consequences.
She will take a God who lives in the very dirt of private fact-if that should seem a likely place to find him. Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience's demands, nothing being omitted.
If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny God's existence? She could see no meaning in treating as 'not true' a notion that was pragmatically so successful. What other kind of truth could there be, for her, than all this agreement with concrete reality? In my last lecture I shall return again to the relations of pragmatism with religion.
But you see already how democratic she is. Her manners are as various and flexible, her resources as rich and endless, and her conclusions as friendly as those of mother nature. I am now to make the pragmatic method more familiar by giving you some illustrations of its application to particular problems. I will begin with what is driest, and the first thing I shall take will be the problem of Substance.
Everyone uses the old distinction between substance and attribute, enshrined as it is in the very structure of human language, in the difference between grammatical subject and predicate.
Here is a bit of blackboard crayon. Its modes, attributes, properties, accidents, or affections,—use which term you will,—are whiteness, friability, cylindrical shape, insolubility in water, etc. But the bearer of these attributes is so much chalk, which thereupon is called the substance in which they inhere. So the attributes of this desk inhere in the substance 'wood,' those of my coat in the substance 'wool,' and so forth. Chalk, wood and wool, show again, in spite of their differences, common properties, and in so far forth they are themselves counted as modes of a still more primal substance, matter, the attributes of which are space occupancy and impenetrability.
Similarly our thoughts and feelings are affections or properties of our several souls, which are substances, but again not wholly in their own right, for they are modes of the still deeper substance 'spirit.
Now it was very early seen that all we know of the chalk is the whiteness, friability, etc. A group of attributes is what each substance here is known-as, they form its sole cash-value for our actual experience. The substance is in every case revealed through THEM; if we were cut off from THEM we should never suspect its existence; and if God should keep sending them to us in an unchanged order, miraculously annihilating at a certain moment the substance that supported them, we never could detect the moment, for our experiences themselves would be unaltered.
Nominalists accordingly adopt the opinion that substance is a spurious idea due to our inveterate human trick of turning names into things. Phenomena come in groups—the chalk-group, the wood-group, etc.
The name we then treat as in a way supporting the group of phenomena. The low thermometer to-day, for instance, is supposed to come from something called the 'climate. But the phenomenal properties of things, nominalists say, surely do not really inhere in names, and if not in names then they do not inhere in anything. The fact of the bare cohesion itself is all that the notion of the substance signifies.
Behind that fact is nothing. Scholasticism has taken the notion of substance from common sense and made it very technical and articulate.
Few things would seem to have fewer pragmatic consequences for us than substances, cut off as we are from every contact with them. Yet in one case scholasticism has proved the importance of the substance-idea by treating it pragmatically. I refer to certain disputes about the mystery of the Eucharist. Substance here would appear to have momentous pragmatic value.
Since the accidents of the wafer don't change in the Lord's supper, and yet it has become the very body of Christ, it must be that the change is in the substance solely. The bread-substance must have been withdrawn, and the divine substance substituted miraculously without altering the immediate sensible properties. But tho these don't alter, a tremendous difference has been made, no less a one than this, that we who take the sacrament, now feed upon the very substance of divinity.
The substance-notion breaks into life, then, with tremendous effect, if once you allow that substances can separate from their accidents, and exchange these latter.
This is the only pragmatic application of the substance-idea with which I am acquainted; and it is obvious that it will only be treated seriously by those who already believe in the 'real presence' on independent grounds. Berkeley's treatment of the notion of matter is so well known as to need hardly more than a mention.
Our world is found once for all to have that peculiarity. So that when we have once directly verified our ideas about one specimen of a kind, we consider ourselves free to apply them to other specimens without verification. They work as true processes would work, give us the same advantages, and claim our recognition for the same reasons. Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realized in rebus, and having only this quality in common, that they PAY.
They pay by guiding us into or towards some part of a system that dips at numerous points into sense- percepts, which we may copy mentally or not, but with which at any rate we are now in the kind of commerce vaguely designated as verification.
Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc. Truth is MADE, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience. Here rationalism is instantaneously up in arms against us. I can imagine a rationalist to talk as follows:.
Our belief that yon thing on the wall is a clock is true already, altho no one in the whole history of the world should verify it. The bare quality of standing in that transcendent relation is what makes any thought true that possesses it, whether or not there be verification. These are merely signs of its being, merely our lame ways of ascertaining after the fact, which of our ideas already has possessed the wondrous quality.
The quality itself is timeless, like all essences and natures. Thoughts partake of it directly, as they partake of falsity or of irrelevancy. The whole plausibility of this rationalist tirade is due to the fact to which we have already paid so much attention. In our world, namely, abounding as it does in things of similar kinds and similarly associated, one verification serves for others of its kind, and one great use of knowing things is to be led not so much to them as to their associates, especially to human talk about them.
The quality of truth, obtaining ante rem, pragmatically means, then, the fact that in such a world innumerable ideas work better by their indirect or possible than by their direct and actual verification. Truth ante rem means only verifiability, then; or else it is a case of the stock rationalist trick of treating the NAME of a concrete phenomenal reality as an independent prior entity, and placing it behind the reality as its explanation.
Rockefeller and Carnegie, but not in the rest of us. Like wealth, health also lives in rebus. It is a name for processes, as digestion, circulation, sleep, etc. But really all these words in TH are exactly similar. Truth exists ante rem just as much and as little as the other things do. The scholastics, following Aristotle, made much of the distinction between habit and act.
Health in actu means, among other things, good sleeping and digesting. But a healthy man need not always be sleeping, or always digesting, any more than a wealthy man need be always handling money, or a strong man always lifting weights.
But those activities are the root of the whole matter and the condition of there being any habit to exist in the intervals. It runs on all fours with the perfectly wise man, and with the absolutely complete experience; and, if these ideals are ever realized, they will all be realized together.
Meanwhile we have to live to-day by what truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood. Ptolemaic astronomy, euclidean space, Aristotelian logic, scholastic metaphysics, were expedient for centuries, but human experience has boiled over those limits, and we now call these things only relatively true, or true within those borders of experience.
Skip to content Unit 3: Epistemology. James struggled through his remaining years to clarify the misunderstandings and to refute the misapplications of his pragmatic truth Pajares, James elaborates in the seventh lecture, how reality itself is a function of our perception.
Reality, he claims, consists of three parts: sensations, relationships we perceive between sensations, and previous truths that influence the sensations we attend to and how we perceive them.
Reality, then, cannot be separated from the human element. In the final lecture, James extends the concept of pragmatic mediation to religion.
He distinguishes between tough-minded empiricists and tender-minded rationalists. According to Merriam-Webster , meliorism is the belief that the world tends to improve and that humans can aid in its betterment.
And, we by our efforts to grow and improve are adding to those conditions. Pragmatism, both as a literary work and as mode of thinking, is difficult to grasp. With good reason, it was applauded as a reasonable approach to find a more satisfying middle ground between opposing philosophies. It appealed to those seeking practical solutions rather than arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. For equally understandable reasons, it was derided as being circular, relativistic, or just plain confusing.
American pragmatism reconsidered: II. William James. The philosophy of William James. James Jr. New York: Henry Holt and Company. William James and the promise of pragmatism. Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking. Retrieved from www. Merriam-Webster's collegiate dictionary 11 ed. Mish, Ed. Pajares, F. William James: Our father who begat us. Schunk Eds. Perry, R. The thought and character of William James Vol.
Boston: Little, Brown. Richardson, R. William James: In the maelstrom of American modernism. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Simon, L. New truth is always a go-between. It marries old opinions to new facts so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity.
We believe a theory to be true just to the degree that it succeeds in smoothly modifying our old mass of opinions. Success in solving this problem of transition is always an approximation, and it varies from person to person. When we say this theory solves a problem more satisfactorily, on the whole, than the other theory, what we really mean is more satisfactorily to ourselves. Individuals emphasize their points of satisfaction differently.
To a certain degree, therefore, everything in this process is fluid. But note particularly the part played in this process by our older truths: their influence is absolutely controlling. Loyalty to our old facts is our first principle—in most cases our only principle. By far the most usual way of handling facts that demand a serious rearrangement of our preconceptions is to ignore such experiences altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness for them.
The simplest way that truths grow is by mere addition to the existing store. That is, we add a new classification of facts to our already existing categories, or we add single new facts to our already existing categories. These additions involve no alteration in the old beliefs.
Day follows day, and our beliefs simply grow in number. The new contents themselves are not true. Truth is what we say about them. The new facts simply come and are. When we say that they have come, that is all that needs to be said. But often the day brings an experience that obliges us to rearrange of our opinions.
I need not multiply instances. When old truth grows by the addition of new truth, it is for subjective reasons. We are part of the process and obey the reasons. So the new idea is truest that performs most felicitously its function of satisfying our twofold need, first, to hang onto as many of our old truths as possible and, second, to blend the insistent novel fact with that older body of truths. The new idea makes itself true, gets itself classed as true, by the way it works, and so the ancient body of truth grows much as a tree grows by the activity of a new layer of cambium.
Having observed this process, Dewey and Schiller generalize their observations by hypothetically assuming that the same process was at work when humankind developed what we now view as our oldest, most firmly established truths.
These once were malleable, and they came to be called true for human reasons. These ancient truths also mediated between still earlier truths and what in those days were novel observations. Purely objective truth, truth that has nothing to do with giving human satisfaction by marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts, is nowhere to be found.
Independent truth, truth that we merely find, truth no longer malleable to human need, truth impossible to correct? Such truth indeed does exist, indeed exists superabundantly. But these words designate only the dead heart of the living tree grown stiff with years of veteran service and petrified in men's regard by sheer antiquity. Even the oldest truths can be quite malleable, as has been vividly shown in our day by the transformation of logical and mathematical ideas, and the new ideas that are even invading physics.
Scientists today increasingly regard the ancient formulas as special, limited expressions of much wider principles that our ancestors never even glimpsed. The brevity of this introduction to the pragmatic theory of truth must make it seem both obscure and unsatisfactory so far, and I promise later to explain the theory much more fully.
Even after hearing my fuller explanation, you still may disagree with me. But I know that you at least will recognize my seriousness and consider my effort with respect. You probably will be surprised to learn, then, that Schiller's and Dewey's theories have suffered a hailstorm of contempt and ridicule. All philosophic rationalists have risen against them.
And why? Pragmatism is uncomfortable away from facts; rationalism is comfortable only in the presence of abstractions. Such truths, the rationalists declare, are not real truth because tests such as usefulness and satisfactoriness are merely subjective.
Objective truth—real truth—must be above utility, must be haughty, refined, remote, august, exalted. Truth must mean the absolute correspondence of our thoughts with an equally absolute reality. Truth must be what we ought to think, unconditionally. Since the ways in which we do think are conditioned by all kinds of circumstances, the ways of actual thinking are irrelevant to truth.
Actual thinking belongs to the field of psychology. So down with psychology, and up with logic in all questions regarding the meaning of truth! That is the motto of rationalistic philosophy. See the exquisite contrast of the types of mind! Pragmatists cling to facts and concreteness, observe truth at its work in particular cases, and then generalize their observations. Truth for the pragmatist is a class-name for all sorts of definite working-values in experience. For the rationalist it remains a pure abstraction to which we must defer.
When the pragmatist undertakes to show in detail just why we must defer, the rationalist is unable to recognize the concrete facts from which his own abstraction is taken. He accuses us of denying truth, whereas we have only sought to trace exactly why people follow truth and always ought to follow it. Your typical ultra-abstractionist fairly shudders at concreteness.
Other things being equal, he positively prefers the pale and spectral. If the two universes were offered, he would always choose the skinny outline rather than the rich thicket of reality. It is so much purer, clearer, nobler. Pragmatism only follows here the example of the sister-sciences, interpreting unobserved phenomena on the basis of observed phenomena. It brings old and new harmoniously together. It converts the absolutely empty notion of a timeless, unchanging 'correspondence' between our minds and reality into a rich, active, and easily understandable interaction between particular thoughts of ours and the great universe of other experiences in which our thoughts play their parts and have their uses.
IV In the first chapter, I said that what is needed today is a philosophy that is capable of harmonizing the empiricist way of thinking with the religious demands of human natures.
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